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Abstract Management objectives of the European Union for North Sea fish stocks are shift-
ing towards considering both biological sustainability and economic benefits. As part of
multiannual management plans, an adjustment restriction on fish quota has been introduced.
Its objective is to obtain an efficient fish stock and to reduce overcapacity for the fishing
industry. We develop and apply a bi-level stochastic dynamic programming model to study
the effect of a quota adjustment restriction on the net present value of resource rents, overca-
pacity and fish stock, when the system is recovering from a downward environmental shock.
At level one, a policy maker sets the quota, considering fishermen behavior, stochastic fish
stock dynamics, capital stock dynamics and a quota adjustment restriction. At level two,
fishermen harvest myopically and make long-term investment decisions, assuming that fish
stock and quota do not change over time. The two levels are linked by the quota, which is
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optimized by the policy maker at level one and becomes a restriction for myopic harvest and
long-term investment decisions of fishermen at level two. Our analysis suggests that in the
long run, overcapacity can be reduced by 54% at modest costs, namely at a 1% reduction in
the net present value of resource rents. Long and short run sustainability of the fish stock is
not affected.
Keywords Fisheries management · Quota adjustment restriction · Investment behavior ·
Stochastic dynamic programming
1 Introduction
An important threat to the survival of many fish species and fisheries is the increase in
fishing fleet capacity, caused by economic incentives of fishermen under open-access and
poor management (Gordon 1954). As there is too much fleet capacity, it is necessary to
reduce this in order to recuperate profits of fishermen and to prevent fish stocks from being
overexploited (Pauly et al. 2002; Clark 2006). The success of a management system is
specified in terms of biological, economic, social and political objectives of the fishing
industry and themanagement authority. Balancing these objectivesmakes the implementation
of policies one of the main challenges in fisheries management (Arnason 2009). Yet, many
management systems have failed to prevent overfishing and have often resulted in an increase
in investments in the fleet capacity, causing overcapacity.Another challenge for policymakers
when adjusting quota on an annual basis is that it is highly dependent on uncertainty about
current fish stock levels, their dynamics and environmental variability (Carson et al. 2009).
Fluctuation in fish stocks leads to annual quota volatility (Daníelsson 2005), which in turn
affects fishermen in their ability to make long-term investment plans (Kell et al. 2005).
In the EuropeanUnion (EU), during the 1992 review of the common fisheries policy (CFP)
it became obvious that there had been overinvestment and overexploitation (Guyader 2002),
with the consequence of decreasing catches. A major reform of the CFP took place in 2002
and consisted of a new commitment to develop recovery and multiannual management plans
for fish stocks. Despite the new measures, the CFP failed to tackle problems of overcapacity
and overexploitation, and profits continued to drop. In 2011, two fishermen organizations
demanded that economic, social and environmental sustainability be combined in the 2012
reform of the CFP (Europêche 2011). Since then, objectives of policy makers have been
shifted towards considering economic benefits and biological sustainability. Eventually, in
the 2013 reform of the CFP, multiannual management plans have been proposed to reduce
annual quota volatility. The objective of these plans is to obtain both efficient fish stocks in
the long run and to provide greater stability for the fishing industry by enabling operators to
plan ahead. Stability is to be provided by restricting the annual change in quota, but besides
setting quota, multiannual management plans also provide measures such as closed areas,
mesh size, gear, inspections, monitoring and effort management.
One of the measures under multiannual management plans is a quota adjustment restric-
tion. This measure restricts annual quota volatility in the sense that quota can at most be
adjusted upward or downward by 15% with respect to the previous quota. There are, how-
ever, potential challenges with this quota adjustment restriction. First, if quota adjustment
is restricted, the quota may not be reduced sufficiently in years of low recruitment and this
can delay fish stock recovery (Kell et al. 2005). The quota also cannot increase by more
than 15%, which prevents benefiting from years of increased recruitment levels (Butter-
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worth 2007). Second, Bennear and Stavins (2007) have shown that a restriction on the policy
instrument causes the policymaker to make sub-optimal decisions and that this has a negative
impact on the net present value of resource rents. Dijk et al. (2013) show that when the quota
are free of any restriction, and the policy maker accounts for dynamics in fish stock and cap-
ital stock, sustainability of the fish stock is realized, however at the cost of maintaining some
overcapacity. This overcapacity is the result of fishermen not being able to adjust their capital
stock to changes in the quota. While it is optimal according to the policy maker to maintain
overcapacity, it can lead to a dissatisfied fishing industry, because maintaining overcapacity
is costly. Consequently, it can turn up the pressure to reduce fluctuation in quota. The current
objective of the policy maker therefore is to obtain both a long-term fish stock that maximizes
expected fishing rents and to reduce overcapacity. However, a quota adjustment restriction
may limit the resource rents from fishing, or delay fish stock recovery. Nevertheless, the
policy maker may consider this a small price to pay for the political ambition to meet fishers’
demand to have a more stable quota policy.
Studies on the quota adjustment restriction have made an attempt at understanding the
effect of this rule on sustainability of fish stocks (Kell et al. 2005, 2006). They show that in
the short run, the effect of the restriction depends on the starting condition of the fish stock,
while in the medium and long run, the restriction hardly affects harvest and sustainability of
the fish stock. The more restrictive the quota adjustment restriction, the stronger its impact.
A quota adjustment restriction between 20 and 40% hardly affects harvest and sustainability
of fish stock, while a 10% quota adjustment restriction leads to large changes in the stock
size and affects the ability to achieve management targets.
These studies have a number of limitations. First, they perform simulations of historical
data of quota and fish stock, while accounting for the quota adjustment restriction. Thismeans
that the simulated quota may be sub-optimal. Second, capital stock and revenues and costs
from harvesting are not considered. It is therefore unknown what the economic impact is of
the adjustment restriction on quota. Third, (Kell et al. 2005, 2006) focus on t path towards a
long-term average, while it remains unknown what the effect is on the system when the fish
stock deviates from this path, e.g. after a shock. Analysis of long-term values in a system
with a quota adjustment restriction does not provide sufficient insight in the effect of such a
restriction on recovery of fish stocks and on overcapacity. The effect of a quota adjustment
restriction is better measured for system states that deviate from long-term stability. Finally,
although the objective of the quota adjustment restriction is to address both recovery of fish
stocks and overcapacity, fishermen behavior in terms of planning and adjusting fleet capacity
is not incorporated in the studies of Kell et al. (2005, 2006). This is a limitation, because
the policy maker makes assumptions about harvest and investment behavior when setting the
quota.
There exists extensive theoretical literature on investment behavior of fishermen, but
because of limited data availability there are few empirical studies that analyze investment
in fisheries (Tsitsika and Maravelias 2008). To the best of our knowledge, there is no general
agreement or evidence from data that fishermen operate with a short-time view, i.e. they act
myopically, or that they have a long planning horizonwhen theymake harvest and investment
decisions. Harvest behavior has been modeled with an infinite planning horizon (Clark et al.
2005; Daníelsson 2005; Singh et al. 2006; Kulmala et al. 2008), as well as myopically
(Hämäläinen et al. 1990; Sandal and Steinshamn 2004; Olaussen and Skonhoft 2008; Dijk
et al. 2013). It has been suggested that myopic harvest is not far off from true fishermen
behavior (Karagiannakos 1996; Grafton et al. 2006; European Commission 2009).
The objective of this paper is to study the effect of a quota adjustment restriction on the net
present value of resource rents, overcapacity and recovery of fish stock, while considering
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biological and economic variables. We first look at the long-term effect of different levels
of quota adjustment restriction and then introduce a downward environmental shock on the
fish stock. To compare with Kell et al. (2005, 2006), we study the effect of different levels
of quota adjustment restriction, including 30, 15, 10 and 5% restrictions. The analysis is
based on a bi-level stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) model. A deterministic bi-level
framework is developed in Homans andWilen (1997) to study the combined implementation
of a quota and season length, which are each determined at a different level. This model
is extended in Anderson (2000) to account for disaggregated vessel level behavior and to
allow for political intervention. A stochastic extension of the model is presented in Rocha
and Gutiérrez (2012), by assuming unknown current levels of fish stock. Characteristic to
the bi-level model in our study is that decisions of the policy maker and fishermen are made
sequentially at their first and second levels, respectively. In game theory such a setting is
called a leader-follower or Stackelberg stage game, where the optimal policy of the leader
(the policy maker) is determined by the reaction of the follower (fishermen) (Munro et al.
2012). Most game theoretic studies simplify the problem by using a single-stage approach
where each player makes a decision at the beginning of the game, given observed states
that change deterministically over time (Bailey et al. 2010). Fewer studies use a multi-stage
approach, where players make a decision at stage one that is independent of the other player’s
behavior.At stage two, each player uses decisions from stage one to decide on the best strategy
(Ruseski 1998; Quinn and Ruseski 2001; Kronbak and Lindroos 2006).
In our bi-level model, at level one, the policy maker determines each year the quota
according to the decision rule that maximizes the net present value of resource rents, while
anticipating fishermen behavior, stochastic fish stock dynamics, capital stock dynamics and
a quota adjustment restriction. This quota adjustment restriction is incorporated by means of
a restriction on the change in the quota, which states that the quota cannot deviate, upward or
downward, by more than 30, 15, 10 or 5% from the quota in the previous year. At level two,
fishermen make myopic harvest decisions and long-term investment decisions, for which it
is assumed that fish stock and quota do not change over time. This can be considered as
a rather simple expression of fishermen behavior. We do not assume adaptive or rational
expectations (or other advanced mechanisms) for the behavior of fishermen. The two levels
are linked by the optimal quota, which is set at level one and becomes a restriction at level
two. The model differs from Ruseski (1998) and Kronbak and Lindroos (2006) by means
of its dynamic perspective, which is that the policy maker adjusts the quota on an annual
basis, based on the decision rule that maximizes the net present value of resource rents, while
anticipating fishermen behavior, stochastic fish stock dynamics, capital stock dynamics and
a quota adjustment restriction. See Bailey et al. (2010) for an overview of the application of
game theory to fisheries over the last 30years.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. Where Kell et al. (2005, 2006) determine
quota through simulations of historical data, we optimize the quota with an adjustment
restriction. Compared to the static multi-stage games in Ruseski (1998) and Kronbak and
Lindroos (2006), we incorporate dynamics by optimizing the quota annually. This optimal
quota is consequently used in a simulation to study the effect of the adjustment restriction
on the net present value of resource rents, overcapacity and recovery of fish stock. Although
Homans andWilen (1997), Anderson (2000) and Rocha and Gutiérrez (2012) study fisheries
policies with a similar bi-level framework, they do not focus on the problem of overcapacity.
Furthermore, in order to study fish stock recovery and overcapacity, dynamics in both fish
stock and capital stock are considered when determining the optimal quota. Finally, resource
rents are compared for the case of a quota without adjustment restriction and a quota with
adjustment restriction.
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2 The Model
We present a bi-level stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) model, where at level one the
policy maker determines the quota that maximizes resource rents, while anticipating fisher-
men behavior, stochastic fish stock dynamics, capital stock dynamics and a quota adjustment
restriction. At level two, fishermen decide on their short-term harvest and long-term invest-
ment levels. For long-term investment fishermen assume that the fish stock and quota will
remain at the current levels. Although decisions of the policy maker and fishermen are made
sequentially, the two levels are linked by the quota that is derived at level one and becomes
a restriction for fishermen at level two.
2.1 Fishermen Decisions
We first describe the decisions at level two, i.e. fishermen behavior with respect to harvest
and investment. We assume that fishermen base their harvest decisions on current costs,
fish prices, capital stock, pre-harvest fish stock and a quota restriction set by the policy
maker. Because the harvesting costs, i.e. the effect on future fish stock, are shared with the
entire fleet, individual fishermen are assumed to ignore the long-term consequences of their
harvest decisions, making harvest a short-term decision. In contrast, investment in capital
is considered a long-term decision, which fishermen make based on pre-harvest fish stock,
capital stock and quota. Parameter values (see Table 1) are based on literature as explained
in Dijk et al. (2013) and in the data section.
2.1.1 Myopic Harvest Behavior
In the literature on fisheries economics, harvest behavior has been modeled with different
assumptions concerning the planning horizon. It is common to assume either an infinite
planning horizon (Clark et al. 2005; Singh et al. 2006; Kulmala et al. 2008) or a short planning
horizon (Hämäläinen et al. 1990; Sandal and Steinshamn 2004; Olaussen and Skonhoft 2008;
Dijk et al. 2014). Nevertheless, myopic harvest has been considered to be close to true
fishermen behavior (Karagiannakos 1996; Grafton et al. 2006; European Commission 2009).
We specify harvest behavior based on current fish, capital and quota levels.
In this model, fishermen react on costs and revenues from harvesting, depending on the
experienced level of fish stock xt and on restrictions due to capital stock kt and quota Qt .
This quota is determined by the policy maker. A Spence harvest function is used to represent













Harvest ht and fish stock xt are expressed in kton, while effort Et is expressed in million
horse power days, mln hpd, and the catchability coefficient q is expressed in mln hpd−1. In
Conrad andClark (1987), cpq has been identified as the bioeconomic equilibrium escapement,
where c stands for the cost per unit of effort and p is the unit price of fish. This is the stock
size where the marginal benefits from fishing to an individual fisherman equal the marginal
costs. This is usually called the open access fish stock. In this model we incorporate the cost
per unit of effort cE , which includes maintenance, haul-in, haul-out and storage. Crew costs
are included separately as the cost per unit of revenue cR , so that the open access fish stock
xˆ is
xˆ = cE
pq(1 − cR )
. (2)
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Table 1 Parameter and variable values from Dijk et al. (2013)
Symbol Definition Value Unit
Biological parameters
xˆ Open access stock of North Sea plaice 185.6 kton
r Intrinsic growth rate of North Sea plaice 0.74 %
M Carrying capacity of North Sea plaice 460 kton
α Quota restriction ± 15 %
μ Mean of the lognormally distributed zt −0.0126
σ Standard deviation of random variable zt 0.16
Economic parameters
p Price 1.83×106 e/kton
q Catchability coefficient 0.0139 mln hpd−1
cE Effort cost 3.54×106 e/mln hpd
cR Crew cost 0.25 %
ci Investment cost 2.1×106 e/mln hpd
δ Discount factor 0.95
γ Vessel depreciation rate 10 %
Biological variables
xt Stock size of North Sea plaice ∈ [xˆ, M] kton
ht Harvest of North Sea plaice ∈ [0, Qt ] kton
Qt Quota for North Sea plaice ∈ [0, M − xˆ] kton
zt i.i.d. random variable ∼ logn(μ, σ )
Economic variables
kt Fleet capacity of North Sea plaice fishery ∈ [0, 1q ln Mxˆ ] mln hpd
it Investment in capital stock ∈ [0,∞] mln hpd
Et Fleet effort North Sea plaice ∈ [0, k] mln hpd
πt Net present value of resource rents mln e




xˆ Maximum fleet capacity 74 mln hpd
nx Number of equidistant levels for xt 23
nk Number of equidistant levels for kt 23
nQ Number of equidistant levels for Qt−1 28
Under pure open access, harvest takes place for a fish stock xt > xˆ . In that case, the open
access harvest level is h˜(xt ) = (xt − xˆ)+, where the operator (y)+ = max{0, y}. In restricted
open access, fishermen are also confronted with quota Qt , expressed in kton, so that the
harvest is





The effort is restricted by the fleet size kt expressed in the same units, Et ≤ kt . Thismeans that
fishermen cannot harvest more than what their capital stock allows. The maximum possible
harvest given the available capital stock is h(xt , kt ) = xt (1−e−qkt ). This gives the following
myopic harvest rule:
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h(xt , kt , Qt ) = min
{





2.1.2 Long-Term Investment Behavior
We now develop a long-term investment rule for fishermen. Although the length of the
planning horizon is subject to considerable debate (Link et al. 2011), it is common to assume
that fishermen decide over the long-term (Eisenack et al. 2006; Singh et al. 2006; Kulmala
et al. 2008). In Eisenack et al. (2006) long-term investment decisions are determined for
a multiple number of identical fishing firms, while in Singh et al. (2006) it concerns the
investment decision of a sole owner. In both studies, decisions are based on known dynamics
in fish stock and capital stock. It is thereby ignored that fisheries are often managed by a
resourcemanager, where each partymay have different knowledge about fish stock dynamics.
In fact, it is unlikely that fishermen have the same knowledge about fish stock growth and
future values of fish stock as a policy maker.
In this model we therefore assume that fishermen have no information about fish stock
dynamics and that the observed fish stock is constant during the investment planning horizon.
The policy maker, whose quota decision will be addressed in Sect. 2.2, does have information
about fish stock growth and can therefore anticipate future dynamics. Similarly, it is assumed
that fishermen have no knowledge about future quota. They therefore consider the current
quota as the future one in their investment decision. That is, the long-term investment decision
is based on observed levels of current fish stock xt , capital stock kt and quota Qt , where the
latter is set by the policy maker. The objective of fishermen is to choose a future investment





π(xt , kt+ j , Qt , it+ j )




π(x, k, Q, i) = (1 − cR)ph(x, k, Q) − cE E(x, k, Q) − ci i (6)
where ρ is the exogenous discount rate and where the fleet is foreseen to develop according
to
kt+ j+1 = (1 − γ )kt+ j + it+ j . (7)
The discounted future profit in (5) are based on revenues from harvest ph minus effort costs
cE E , crew costs cR ph and investment costs ci i . As in Elliston and Cao (2006), we include
crew costs as a constant share per unit of revenue. Decisions ht+ j , Et+ j , it+ j are determined
by current observed fish stock xt , capital stock kt+ j and by the decision of the policy maker,
quota Qt . Decision Et+ j follows from ht+ j = h(xt , kt+ j , Qt ). A constraint is included,
namely fishermen assume for all years t + j that both fish stock xt and quota Qt remain
constant at levels xt and Qt .
A good approximation of the optimum investment level it of problem (5), (6), (7) can be
derived from the following reasoning. Consider that fishermen invest such that the investment
extends in one period directly to the capital level corresponding to long-run harvest h, given
fish stock x and quota Q. Investment is zero if the capital stock exceeds this level:
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with
h = min{x − cE + ciγ
pq(1 − cR) , Q}. (9)
For a derivation see “Appendix 1”.
2.2 The Policy Maker
At level one, a policy maker sets the quota, considering fishermen behavior, stochastic fish
stock dynamics, capital stock dynamics and a quota adjustment restriction. We first present
the bio-economic model for optimal quota adjustment and then describe the solution method
of stochastic dynamic programming in terms of all its components.
2.2.1 Bio-economic Model for Annual Quota Adjustment
At level one, the policy maker determines the annual quota for the fishing industry.1 The
objective of the policy maker is to determine the quota Qt that maximizes the net present










with resource rents πt according to (6). We incorporate a quota adjustment restriction by
means of a restriction on the change in the quota:
A ≤ Qt ≤ B, (11)
where A = Qt−1(1−α) and B = Qt−1(1+α), andwhere Qt−1(1−α) ≤ Qt ≤ Qt−1(1+α)
states that the quota cannot deviate more than α from the previous quota Qt−1.
Harvest ht in (4) and investment it in (8) are fishermen decisions at level two, that are
determined by fish stock xt , capital stock kt and the quota decision Qt of the policy maker.
This means that the policy maker anticipates harvest and investment decisions of fishermen,
which coincide with the harvest and investment rules in (4) and (8). The difference is that
the policy maker has information about future, stochastic fish stock development and uses
this information to protect the fishery from overinvestment and overfishing. In the objective
function of the policy maker the notation E therefore represents the expectation taken over
possible outcomes of fish stock xt and capital stock kt . Fish dynamics are modeled as





− ht , (12)
where stochastic fish stock growth is represented by an i.i.d. random variable zt that is
lognormally distributed. The fleet develops according to
kt+1 = (1 − γ ) kt + it . (13)
2.2.2 Solution Method: Stochastic Dynamic Programming
The model for setting the quota can be solved numerically using stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming. We assume an infinite horizon problem with discrete time steps. In each year, the
1 In this model setting, it is assumed that fishermen perfectly comply with the enforced quota. Problems
related to non-compliance are discussed in, among others (Nielsen 2003; Grafton et al. 2010; Fulton et al.
2011).
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quota can at most be adjusted upward or downward by a specified percentage with respect to
the quota in the previous period. Following the literature on stochastic dynamic programming
(Howard 1960; Puterman 1994; Judd 1998), we discuss the state (space), decision (space),
state transition (probabilities), the contribution, the Bellman equation and computational
complexity. In particular we pay attention to the implementation of the solution method.
State and State Space The state is the state of fish stock xt and capital stock kt at the start
of year and the quota from the previous period Qt−1, because each year the quota decision
Qt can at most be adjusted upward or downward by a specified percentage with respect to
Qt−1; the state is (xt , kt , Qt−1). The state space is continuous, as fish stock xt , capital kt and
last year’s quota Qt−1 are continuous. For numerical calculations a grid is chosen with nx
levels of x , nk levels of k, and nQ levels of quota. The grid consists of nx × nk × nQ states.
To simplify notations, the state is denoted as (xt , kt , Qt−1) irrespective of the value of t .
Decision and Decision Space The decision is Qt , the quota that holds for year t . The
decision space is continuous and does not require a grid, for reasons explained below.
Transition and Transition Probabilities State transitions from (xt , kt , Qt−1) to (xt+1,
kt+1, Qt ) follow Eqs. (12) and (13). In (12), zt is a continuous stochastic variable, which has
been discretized into 40 quantiles of the underlying probability distribution. For evaluating a
decision in a particular state, we consider thus forty transitions with equal probability 0.025.
Although transitions will be considered from all states (xt , kt , Qt−1) on the grid, the resulting
states (xt+1, kt+1, Qt ) usually are not on the grid. In discussing the Bellman equation we
explain how we deal with this issue.
Contribution The objective function (10) is separable in contributions per period in (6).
Bellman Equation The objective function can be defined recursively:
V (xt , kt , Qt−1) = max
A≤Qt≤B
{
π(xt , kt , Qt , i(xt , kt , Qt )) + δE
[
V (xt+1, kt+1, Qt )
]}
. (14)
Vt is the value function that represents the maximized value of the objective function from
time t onwards, δ = 1/(1+ρ) < 1 is the exogenous discount factor.Note that because both the
discount rate ρ and discount factor δ are exogenous, the number of variables does not change
by using ρ or δ.E is the expectations operator that holds the transition probabilities of moving
from a given current state of fish stock xt to next period’s fish stock xt+1. Restrictions on
quota Qt are given by A and B in (11). Assuming a long horizon of T years, we can solve the
maximization problem recursively, starting with VT (xT , kT , QT−1) = 0, for all nx ×nk ×nQ
states on the grid. Next, successively VT−1, VT−2, . . . , V2, V1 are computed for all states on
the grid. For states that are not on the grid, the state values are derived by interpolation.
Computational Complexity For the bounds of the state space of fish stock, we have xt ∈
[xˆ, M]. Because of the assumption that ht = 0 if xt < xˆ , we do not consider values below xˆ .
From this assumption follows that a reasonable range for optimal quota is Qt ∈ [0, M − xˆ].
Finally, for the bounds of the state space of capital stock we have kt ∈ [0, 1q ln Xxˆ ]. The grid
of the state space has equidistant levels of xt , kt and Qt−1. For each state (xt , kt , Qt−1) a
nonlinear search procedure is applied, in which interpolation is used to estimate state values.
The numerical procedure of (14) is also known as Value Function Iteration. For a general
description of the value iteration process see Puterman (1994). A technical explanation of
this specific bi-level SDP model is provided in Dijk et al. (2014).
2.3 Application to North Sea Plaice
The model is applied to a stylized setting for the management of North Sea plaice, for which
parameter values have been derived in Dijk et al. (2013). North Sea plaice is a commercially
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exploited flatfish in the EU, with catch mainly coming from demersal towed gears, otter
trawls, beam trawls and anchor seines. Since the 1950s, the fishing industry has contributed
significantly to the change in growth of the North Sea plaice stock and has affected the
stock biomass, spawning stock biomass and harvest (Rijnsdorp and Leeuwen 1996). More
specifically, growth increased between 1960 and 1970, stabilized between 1970 and 1977
and decreased abruptly between 1978 and the mid 1980s. In the 1990s, growth stabilized
again and since 2010 the stock has been within safe biological limits (Van Keeken et al.
2004; ICES 2013). Particularly low growth rates were observed in 1963, 1972, 1985–1987
and 1996–1997. The success of recent years is related to multiannual management plans,
including a quota adjustment restriction, which have been adopted for North Sea plaice by
the EU Council in 2007 and put into effect in 2008 (CEC 2007).
For the stylized setting in this paper, biological parameter values are obtained from ICES
data (Rijnsdorp and Millner 1996; Grift et al. 2003; Kell and Bromley 2004; Pilling et al.
2008). For economic data theNetherlands are used as representative country for the remaining
EU countries that exploit plaice in the North Sea ( Van Balsfoort 2006; Taal et al. 2009; CEC
2007). Fish stock, harvest and quota are measured in kton, while effort and capital stock are
measured in terms of millions of horse power days, mln hpd, which is derived from the vessel
engine capacity and number of days at sea. In reality, fishing effort is a multidimensional
variable, consisting of the number of days at sea, vessel engine capacity, storage capacity,
boat length and many other inputs, which to some extent may be mutually substituted. The
combination of number of days at sea and vessel engine capacity, hpd, is therefore a useful
unit for fishing effort. Note, however, that hpd may be partly replaced by other inputs such
as sonar technology and other types of fishing gear. Table 1 gives an overview of parameter
and variable values. The model is solved using Matlab.
2.4 Underlying Assumptions
In the current version of the model we have assumed that fishermen have a long-term
investment-planning horizon and that they each year behave as if the current levels of fish
stock and quota will not change over time. Alternative approaches to modeling investment
behavior of fishermen may assume different planning horizons, some awareness among fish-
ermen of fish stock dynamics, or rational expectations of fishermen concerning future quota.
One way is to include fluctuations in expected quota, so that fishermen expect quota to vary
in response to the fish stock and harvest. This adds complexity to the model, because it
requires the iterative optimization of both the decisions of fishermen on investment and the
policy maker’s quota decision in the same stochastic setting. Another way is to assume that
fishermen consider a moving average of stock size in their decisions, rather than the current
stock size. This approach requires at least one more state variable, i.e. last year’s average,
which together with the current year’s stock determines the new average. An additional state
variable increases the dimension of the problem and hence makes the model more complex.
Fishermen could also be assumed to consider a probability distribution for the future fish
stock and quota. This requires choosing a distribution, a standard deviation and a stochastic
process that may not be known. With regard to the policy maker we assume full knowledge
on fishermen’s decisions, whereas alternative approaches might assume imperfect or even
biased information about fishermen’s decisions.
This model does not distinguish between the policy maker and fishermen in terms of their
risk preference and discount rate. Both decisionmakers are implicitly considered risk-neutral,
but in certain fisheries the decision makers may be risk averse. An alternative approach might
specify risk aversion through the direct utility function, such that the decision maker (either
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the policy maker and/or fishermen) is willing to accept lower expected returns in exchange
for lower risk. With respect to the assumed discount rate, it may be interesting to assume a
divergence between private and social discount rates, such that, possibly, fishermen discount
future costs and benefits heavier than policy makers do. Such a divergence has been argued
for in the literature. For example, Weitzman (1994) and Weitzman (1998) argue that with
increasing income levels and economic activity over time, concerns about environmental
externalities become more important. This implies that the social discount rate should be
lower than the private discount rate. Also Stern (2007) argues for a low social discount rate,
however with the argument that discounting is important only to account for the possibility
of extinction of the resource.
Finally, the Spence function assumed in this study is one of many possible harvest func-
tions. In the fisheries economics literature mainly three harvest functions are used, which
are the Gordon–Schaefer, Cobb–Douglas and Spence functions. The Gordon–Schaefer func-
tion assumes that catch per unit of effort is proportional to the level of fish stock, which
remains valid for all levels of effort and fish stock (Gordon 1954; Schaefer 1954). In any
1year the harvest is a linear function of effort, which makes the catch per unit of effort
(CPUE) constant throughout the fishing season for a given fish stock size. It also means that
effort can be indefinitely applied in the short run and that harvest increases at a constant rate.
These assumptions are not realistic in a discrete time model, because as fishing progresses
within the fishing season, CPUE declines due to the declining stock size. The Spence harvest
function (Spence 1973) explicitly takes into account this effect of fishing on CPUE within
one fishing season. This function resembles the Baranov function (Baranov 1918), which is
often used by biologists. Similar to the Gordon–Schaefer function, the Cobb–Douglas func-
tion assumes decreasing CPUE with harvest, although for the Cobb–Douglas function this
property is not derived from the effect of fishing on CPUE through a declining remaining
stock. For the discrete-time model in this study, the characteristics of the Spence function
make it the most appropriate harvest function. It furthermore allows us to easily derive the
open-access escapement and relates most to what biologists use in their models.
3 Results
We first look at the effect of a quota adjustment restriction on long-term quota fluctuation.
We then introduce a downward environmental shock in the system and study the effect of the
quota adjustment restriction on resource rents, overcapacity and recovery of fish stock. Such
a shock is a realistic scenario to consider, given the low growth rates of North Sea plaice that
were observed in 1963, 1972, 1985–1987 and 1996–1997.
3.1 Long-Term Effect of a Quota Adjustment Restriction
Let us first consider the effect of a quota adjustment restriction on quota fluctuation. Based
on a simulation of one run with a sample path of 200years and given initial stock values
x0 = 350, k0 = 14, Fig. 1 illustrates the relative annual change in quota (Qt − Qt−1)/Qt−1,
when the quota is not restricted. The relative annual change in quota ranges from -0.17 to
0.37 and has a standard deviation of σ = 0.08. That is, the volatility in quota change is large
and results in overcapacity. When a 5% quota adjustment restriction is applied to the quota,
the relative annual change in quota is illustrated in Fig. 2, with given initial stock values
x0 = 350, k0 = 14, Q0 = 65. The relative annual change in quota ranges from -0.04 to 0.05,
with a lower volatility of σ = 0.02.
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Fig. 1 A 200years sample path of relative annual quota change (Qt − Qt−1)/Qt−1, with given initial stock
values x0 = 350, k0 = 14; no quota adjustment restriction






























Fig. 2 A 200years sample path of relative annual quota change (Qt − Qt−1)/Qt−1, with given initial stock
values x0 = 350, k0 = 14, Q0 = 65; 5% quota adjustment restriction
We use the optimal quota Qt , derived from Eq. (14), to study the effect of a quota adjust-
ment restriction on long-term average discounted resource rents, overcapacity and fish stock.
Table 2 shows results for different levels of quota adjustment restriction, i.e. 30, 15, 10, 5%.
Average values of long-term discounted resource rents πt , overcapacity kt − Et , capital stock
kt , effort Et , quota Qt , harvest ht and fish stock xt are based on 5,000 sample paths over
100years each. Furthermore, an estimate is given of the number of years where harvest is
bounded by capital stock and quota, i.e. Et = kt and ht = Qt respectively.
Long-term averages of resource rents πt , quota Qt , harvest ht and fish stock xt are little or
not affected by a 30 and 15% quota adjustment restriction. Overcapacity kt − Et is slightly
lower under a 30% adjustment restriction and continues to reduce as the system becomes
more restrictive. As has been put forward in Bennear and Stavins (2007), here we observe
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what is to be expected from a restriction, namely sub-optimal decisions lead to a reduction in
the net present value of resource rents. Compared to a quota without adjustment restriction,
however, under a 5% quota adjustment restriction resource rents are reduced by 1% while
overcapacity is reduced by 54%. Less overcapacity here, i.e. from 0.28 to 0.13, is due to
keeping a lower capital stock and a lower effort level. This is the reaction of fishermen to a
lower long-term quota. Because the policymaker is limited in the adjustment of quota, a lower
level is maintained so that uncertain levels of future fish stock, as a consequence of stochastic
growth, are anticipated. At the same time, characteristics of the Spence harvest function
prevent the fish stock from going extinct (Reed 1979; Nøstbakken 2008). In this model, the
Spence harvest function ensures that the fish stock always exceeds the open access fish stock
xˆ . Fishermen therefore do not fully harvest the quota. On one hand, the policy maker tailors
the quota to the investment behavior of fishermen, affecting thereby harvest and investment
decisions. On the other hand, fishermen assume fixed levels of fish stock and quota over
the entire investment planning horizon. Eventually, the effect of the policy and the response
of fishermen are observed in the long-term fish stock. With less capital input under a 5%
quota adjustment restriction, harvest decreases as well and the long-term average fish stock
increases by 1%.
How often capital stock Et = kt and quota ht = Qt are binding, is shown by the
percentages over all 500,000 simulated years. Without quota adjustment restriction, capital
is binding 31% of the simulated years. This percentage increases to 48% as the system
becomes more restrictive. This can be explained by fishermen choosing an effort level that
follows the capital stock more closely, where this effort reaches the level of the available
capital stock more often. Without an adjustment restriction, the quota is binding 69% of
the time and this reduces to 52% as we consider a more restrictive quota adjustment. With
fishermen reducing overcapacity, it is the capital stock that becomes more often the binding
factor, while the quota is less frequently the binding factor.
3.2 Recovery from an External Shock
We now turn to the case where the fish stock is temporarily reduced due to an external
environmental shock that is not anticipated by the policy maker when setting the quota.
This means, the external shock is in addition to the assumption of stochastic growth. The
difference is that stochastic growth is anticipated by the policy maker, whereas a shock is an
event to which the quota is adjusted at the moment of occurring. With reference to the double
objective of the policy maker, i.e. to obtain an efficient fish stock and to reduce overcapacity,
we are concerned with the following question. After a downward external shock, what is
the effect of a quota adjustment restriction on resource rents, overcapacity and fish stock
recovery?
To investigate this question, we simulate the system, where the fish stock reduces instanta-
neously, but temporarily to xt = 200 in year t = 20. Table 3 shows long-term and short-term
discounted resource rents πt/(1+ρ)t , as well as overcapacity kt − Et , capital stock kt , effort
Et , quota Qt and harvest ht over a 5years recovery period, i.e. between t = 20 and t = 24.
Fish stock recovery |x24 − x100 | is measured as the absolute difference between the fish stock
in t = 24 and its long-term average in t = 100. Again, we consider different levels of quota
adjustment restriction, i.e. 30, 15, 10, 5%. Reported values are averages over 5,000 sample
paths. Long-term resource rents are taken over a period of 80years.
The long-run analysis suggests that a restrictive system provides a reduction in overcapac-
ity in exchange for lower resource rents. Table 3 shows that the long-term effect, including
recovery from a downward external shock, i.e. the period t = 20 to t = 100, provides a
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similar conclusion with respect to resource rent reduction. Compared to a quota without
adjustment restriction, long-term resource rents can be reduced by 3% under a 5% quota
adjustment restriction. This is because in the short-term with an adjustment restriction, the
policy maker can bring down the quota only by a small amount. During the 5years recovery
period, restricting quota adjustment by more than 30% has little effect on resource rents.
Compared to a quota without restriction, each adjustment restriction provides a 10–11%
decrease in resource rents, regardless of its size. During the same period, overcapacity can
be reduced by 38–50%, again independently of the size of the restriction. This is realized
by keeping lower levels of capital stock and higher levels of effort as a result of setting the
cumulative quota higher as the system becomes more restrictive. Higher effort also explains
the increased cumulative harvest during recovery and a fish stock that, in year t = 24, is
further away from the long-term average.
Figure 3 shows the levels of quota during recovery. Without adjustment restriction, the
quota reduces to zero in t = 20, after which it can be adjusted according to fish stock recovery.
Introducing and increasing the level of quota adjustment restriction gives that the quota in
t = 20 is set at a higher level because the adjustment restriction sets a lower bound on the
quota. With restriction, the harvest is actually limited by the open access fish stock in t = 20.
This means that on average, the quota in this year is not binding and thereby does not affect
the effort level, effort costs and resource rents.
Figure 4 shows how often capital stock is binding, i.e. Et = kt , during the 1,000 simula-
tions for each of the years t = 20 up to t = 40. In t = 20 the fish stock reduces to a level at
which the capital stock cannot be fully used. The capital stock therefore does not limit effort
and harvest under any considered quota adjustment restriction.With fishermen assuming that
the fish stock remains at this level throughout the investment planning horizon, the invest-
ment level drops to zero and in t = 21 the capital stock reduces with the fleet depreciation.
While the capital stock reduces in t = 21, the fish stock increases rapidly, causing desired
harvest and effort levels to hit the fleet capacity. This occurs in most of the simulations, i.e.
89–100%, under 15, 10 and 5% quota adjustment restrictions. If quota adjustment is limited
to 30% or not limited at all, the number of times that the full capacity is reached remains low,

















no quota adjustment restriction
30% quota adjustment restriction
15% quota adjustment restriction
10% quota adjustment restriction
5% quota adjustment restriction
Fig. 3 Average quota Qt over 5,000 sample paths of 20years each, without and with different levels of quota
adjustment restriction, i.e. 30, 15, 10, 5%, and given a downward shock in t = 20
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no quota adjustment restriction
30% quota adjustment restriction
15% quota adjustment restriction
10% quota adjustment restriction
5% quota adjustment restriction
Fig. 4 Binding capital stock Et = kt as a percentage of 5,000 simulations in the 20years period after the
shock

























no quota adjustment restriction
30% quota adjustment restriction
15% quota adjustment restriction
10% quota adjustment restriction
5% quota adjustment restriction
Fig. 5 Binding quota ht = Qt as a percentage of 5,000 simulations in the 20years period after the shock
i.e. 4–5%, as it is the quota that limits the harvest. Due to the large investment under 15, 10
and 5% quota adjustment restrictions, in t = 22 a large fleet capacity becomes available. A
30% quota adjustment restriction, or no restriction, causes investment to be small in t = 21
such that the fleet capacity becomes more restrictive in t = 22, i.e. 26–98%. In the following
years, the difference fades out because the fish stock approaches its long-term average.
Figure 5 shows how often quota is binding ht = Qt during the years t = 20 up to t = 40.
In the year of the shock, only a restriction-free system can follow the downward movement
of the harvest in 100% of the simulations. With an adjustment restriction, the quota cannot
follow and is not binding. Although the fish stock is able to increase rapidly at a zero quota,
it is still in recovery in t = 21, such that harvest is limited by quota in a large number of
the simulations, i.e. 96%. The 30 and 15% quota adjustment restrictions provide the same
tendency. The investment in year t = 21 increases, especially in a system with no adjustment
restriction because of the zero quota and zero investment in the previous year. Consequently,
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in t = 22 the desired open access harvest h˜(xt ) = (xt − xˆ)+ exceeds the quota. This provides
a large number of simulations, i.e. 99–100%, of harvest being limited by the quota under a 15
10 and 5% adjustment restriction. In the following years, the system recovers from the shock
and returns to its long-term state where a quota with adjustment restriction is less limiting
for harvest than a quota without restriction.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
To analyze to what extent results change due to changes in parameter values, we conduct
a sensitivity analysis. Table 4 in “Appendix 1” shows the effect of changes in economic
parameters on long-term average values of resource rents, overcapacity, capital stock, effort,
quota, harvest and fish stock. In a ceterus paribus analysis, we considered a 50% increase
in the effort cost cE , crew cost cR and investment cost cI each; a 25% price (p) increase; a
100% increase in the vessel depreciation rate (γ ); a reduction of the discount factor (δ) to
0.85. Results are compared with the baseline results in Table 2.
Compared to the baseline, results confirm the expectation that at an increase in effort,
investment and crew costs, resource rents decrease under all levels of quota adjustment
restriction (including no restriction). A lower discount factor, implying that future resource
rents are valued less, reduces long-term discounted resource rentsmost. For example, without
restriction resource rents reduce from 643mlne(in the baseline) to 216mlne. Only a higher
price results in higher resource rents; without restriction, resource rents increase from 643
mln e(in the baseline) to 1097 mln e.
A higher investment cost comes with an incentive to reduce vessel purchases and to keep
idle capital at low levels. Both investment levels and overcapacity are therefore reduced,
which is translated into a relatively small reduction in resource rents. Note that, compared to
the baseline, overcapacity increases as the quota adjustment becomes more restrictive (from
0.01 mln hpd without adjustment restriction to 0.13 hpd with a 5% adjustment restriction).
This increase is somewhat counter-intuitive, but may be explained along the standard devi-
ation (σ ) of overcapacity. In the baseline, overcapacity has a standard deviation that ranges
between σ = 0.02 (for 15 and 10% quota adjustment restrictions) and σ = 0.03 (for no
restriction as well as 30 and 5% quota adjustment restrictions). At a higher investment cost,
we find that the sigma of overcapacity decreases as the system becomes more restrictive; the
standard deviation decreases from σ = 0.06 (no restriction) to σ = 0.04 (5% restriction).
Although long-term overcapacity increases as the system becomes more restrictive, there is
less fluctuation, hence the lower σ . In fact, at a 5% quota adjustment restriction, overcapac-
ity and its σ are at the level of the baseline. Note, however, that at a higher investment cost
absolute levels of overcapacity are very low between no restriction and a 10% adjustment
restriction. Due to such low levels the quota is still reduced under a more restrictive quota
adjustment system, as well as capital stock, effort and harvest.
A higher vessel depreciation rate has a similar effect on overcapacity. In this case the idle
fleet size is kept at low levels because the size of the fleet decreases more rapidly. As the
quota adjustment becomes more restrictive, overcapacity increases and its standard deviation
decreases as the system becomes more restrictive. The decrease is between σ = 0.07 at no
restriction and σ = 0.05 at a 5% quota adjustment restriction. Also here it should be noted
that absolute levels of overcapacity are low.
Table 5 in “Appendix 1” shows the effect of changes in the economic parameters on
resource rents, overcapacity, quota, harvest and fish stock when the fish stock reduces tem-
porarily due to an external shock.We compare with results from the baseline for this scenario
(Table 3). Similar to the case without a shock, we find that in the long run the downward
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shock has little effect on resource rents. The increase in effort, investment and crew costs
result in lower long-term resource rents, with an additional small reduction caused by the
downward shock. Also when we look at the 5-year recovery period only, resource rents are
reduced at higher effort, investment and crew costs. The largest reduction is found at a higher
effort cost, whereas short-term resource rents increase at a higher price.
With respect to short-termovercapacity, under any scenario this seems to decrease between
no restriction and a 10% quota adjustment restriction. At a 5% quota adjustment restriction,
overcapacity increases slightly, but is still far below the level of no restriction. Note that
fishermen assume that the quota and fish stock do not change throughout their investment
planning horizon, while during the 5-year recovery period both fish stock and quota change
by great amounts. At such a stringent quota adjustment (5%) it becomes more difficult for
fishermen to adjust to the large changes in fish stock and quota during this 5-year recovery
period. The increase in overcapacity may be the result of this.
4 Summary and Conclusions
The EU has introduced an adjustment restriction on fish quota to obtain an efficient fish
stock and to reduce overcapacity in the fishing industry. We studied the effect of a quota
adjustment restriction on the net present value of resource rents, overcapacity and fish stock
using a bi-level stochastic dynamic programming model. At level one, the policy maker
determines the quota that maximizes expected discounted resource rents, keeping in mind a
quota adjustment restriction. At level two, fishermen make their myopic harvest and long-
term investment decisions, while being restricted by the quota that is derived at level one.
Our results suggest that without a quota adjustment restriction, volatility in annual quota
change is large, which makes it difficult for fishermen to make accurate long-term investment
decisions. Consequently, in the long run large quota volatility results in overcapacity for the
fishing industry. When a quota adjustment restriction is implemented, annual quota volatility
reduces, realizing in the long run both an efficient fish stock and reduced overcapacity. By
anticipating uncertain future values of fish stock, the policymaker becomesmore conservative
and sets the quota at a somewhat lower level than without quota adjustment restriction.
Fishermen follow this quota by reducing their effort level and by adjusting their capital stock
downward, such that they are less often bounded by quota and they are able to realize a large
reduction in overcapacity. The policy maker has to consider the trade-off between resource
rents and stability of the system, but the price for less volatility in the quota, i.e. lower expected
resource rents, appears to be small. Under a high level of quota adjustment restriction a 54%
reduction in overcapacity can be realized at a 1% loss in resource rents. Fish stock increases
thereby with 1%, so that long-run efficiency of the fish stock is not affected.
We also studied the behavior of the system after a downward environmental shock, where
the fish stock reduces temporarily to an extremely low level due to an external factor that
policy makers are assumed not to have taken into account. During the recovery period after
the shock, both the policy maker and fishermen have to adjust their decisions to the new
situation. The policy maker keeps in mind that long-term resource rents are maximized, that
the long-term fish stock is kept at a sustainable level and that fishermen in any year choose an
effort level that is based on their currently available capital stock and on the currently observed
fish stock (or open access fish stock). This is all reflected in the adjustment path of the quota.
In the year of the shock, the reduced fish stock prevents fishermen from using their full
fleet capacity. Given that fishermen assume that the future fish stock remains at its currently
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observed level, they not only adjust their investment level to zero, also the current fleet size
reduces due to depreciation. The effort level is therefore adjusted downwards. As the fish
stock grows in the following year, fishermen have an economic incentive again to increase
their fleet capacity. However, with a 1-year lag in the availability of the investment and the
continuous growth in fish stock, it takes approximately 7years for the long-term balance
between effort and capital stock to return. The quota only becomes limiting after the capital
stock is adjusted to higher levels and the fish stock approaches its long-term average. This
holds for all considered quota adjustment restrictions. Over a 5years recovery period, there-
fore, all considered quota adjustment restrictions lead to a 10–11% loss in resource rents
compared to the maximized resource rents when adjustment is unrestricted. Hence, also dur-
ing recovery from an external shock the reduction in overcapacity comes at the cost of a
reduction in expected discounted resource rents. The analysis shows that long-term resource
rents reduce with the introduction and lower percentage of quota adjustment restriction.
Compared to no restriction, a quota adjustment restriction provides a 38–50% reduction
in overcapacity. Although the external shock reduces the fish stock to an extremely low level,
the Spence harvest function assumes that the fish stock cannot be fully harvested. In addition,
the quota steers harvest and investment such that, after a shock, the fish stock increases and
stabilizes at its long-term average. Although we agree with (Kell et al. 2005) that a quota
adjustment restriction delays fish stock recovery, the delay appears to be small and the long-
term efficiency is not affected under any restriction. In the long-run, the objective of both
obtaining an efficient fish stock and reducing overcapacity for fishermen is realized with a
quota adjustment restriction.
Keeping inmind the assumptionsmade in this study, our results suggest that a quota adjust-
ment restriction can be effective and hence recommended as a policy for the management of
North Sea plaice. However, although the policy leads to long-term stability of the fish stock,
it should be well-monitored in order to keep some leverage to adjust the quota under extreme
conditions that affect the fish stock. In addition, there may be other causes to the problem
of fluctuating quota, namely the management procedure itself, which is subject to time-lags
between data collection, stock assessment and management implementation. In that case, a
quota adjustment restriction addresses the outcome but not the cause of the problem.
The European fish stocks that were studied by means of simulations in Kell et al. (2005)
and Kell et al. (2006) include Northeast Atlantic plaice and sole, as well as North Sea
cod, haddock, whiting and saithe, Southern and Northern hake, and Eastern and Western
Baltic cod. Our optimization model can be adapted to study the effect of a quota adjustment
restriction on efficiency of these species and overcapacity, provided that each species has its
own growth dynamics and base parameter values.
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Appendix 1
When fishermen decide on the long-term investment, they consider depreciation of capital
stock γ and investment costs ci i , leading to the fishermen profit function (6). Profitπ depends
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on revenues from harvest ph, costs from effort, crew and investment cE E + cR ph + ci i . In
(5)–(7), fishermen are free to adapt the fleet size in one period to a long-term desired level
in case its capacity is insufficient to catch the profit maximizing harvest, which depends on
the quota Q and fish stock x . After adaptation, effort and the capital stock are at the same
constant level E = k and investment i is equal to the depreciated capital stock γ k. Let us
first denote fishermen profit:
π = (1 − cR )ph − cE E − ci i (15)














and profit function (15) can be rewritten as
π = (1 − cR )ph −








The maximum of π in (17) with respect to harvest h can be derived from the first-order
condition that should also take into account that profit is non-negative. This provides us with
a harvest level h = (x − x¯)+ where
x¯ = cE + ciγ
pq(1 − cR)p . (18)
However, harvest is also constrained by quota Q, such that the optimum harvest level is
h = min
{
x − cE + ciγ
pq(1 − cR) , Q
}
. (19)






fishermen can directly, i.e. in 1year, arrive at the desired capital stock by investing the
difference between desired effort E¯ and the depreciated capital stock (1− γ )k. If the capital















See Tables 4 and 5.
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